How privacy works.

Every chat in the private lane is sealed on your device and opened only inside sealed hardware that your device checks first. Below, the whole architecture in diagrams, each in plain words, in how it works, and in full detail.

Read it your way

Locked until the vault.

One picture first. Every diagram below adds detail to it.

In plain words

Your device locks each message in a box that only the vault can open. Thinkr carries the box but has no key. The vault opens it, writes the answer, locks it again, and sends it back.

How it works

The vault is a hardware enclave. Before your device sends a word, it checks a report signed by the enclave's chip, then encrypts the message to a key that exists only inside the enclave.

The details

Encryption
HPKE, RFC 9180
CPU
AMD SEV-SNP · Intel TDX
GPU
NVIDIA, confidential mode
If a check fails
Nothing is sent

Every part, and every link.

Your device, Thinkr's relay, and the enclaves, with the proof that ties them together.

In plain words

Three places handle your chat: your device, Thinkr's relay, and the enclaves. Only the enclaves ever see your words, and your device checks them before it trusts them.

How it works

The app verifies the attestation of the router enclave and seals to it. The relay forwards ciphertext and meters usage. The router verifies each model enclave, weights included, before it forwards.

The details

Device to relay
TLS 1.3, HPKE inside
Router
AMD SEV-SNP
Models
Intel TDX or AMD SEV-SNP
GPUs
NVIDIA, confidential mode
Releases
Signed, in a public log

Two locks on every message.

One lock for the trip, and one for the words.

In plain words

The first lock protects the trip. The companies on the way can open it, and inside they find only the second lock, which opens only in the enclave.

How it works

TLS 1.3 ends at the edge of Cloudflare and at the relay. The body inside is an HPKE ciphertext sealed to the attested key of the enclave, so neither of them can read it.

The details

Lock 1
TLS 1.3
Lock 2
HPKE, RFC 9180
Key exchange
X25519
Cipher
AES-256-GCM
Key of lock 2
Made inside the enclave

What happens when you press send.

Eight steps, from the first question to the last word of the answer.

In plain words

Before your words leave, your device asks the vault for its papers, checks them with the chip maker and a public record, and only then locks the message for that vault.

How it works

Attestation, then verification, then HPKE key encapsulation, then sealed transport. The router repeats the verification for each model enclave it sends to.

The details

Report
AMD SEV-SNP attestation
Root of trust
The chip maker
Code check
Signed release, public log
Key
HPKE · X25519
Body
AES-256-GCM

Sealed, even from the server.

What the chip keeps out, and what runs inside.

In plain words

The chip encrypts the enclave's memory with keys it never shows. The people and the software that run the server see only scrambled data.

How it works

SEV-SNP and TDX encrypt and protect the memory of the guest and lock the hypervisor out. The GPU takes only encrypted transfers from the guest, and must pass the attestation of NVIDIA before the server starts.

The details

Memory
Encrypted by the CPU
Hypervisor
Locked out
CPU to GPU
Encrypted transfers
GPU check
At boot, or no boot
Disk
Nothing written

A chain anyone can check.

From the key of the chip maker to the key your words are sealed to.

In plain words

Each link vouches for the next, from the company that made the chip to the key your message is locked to.

How it works

The device verifies the chain of certificates from the root of the chip maker to the attestation key of the chip, the signature of the report, and its measurement against the signed release in a transparency log.

The details

Root
Certificates of the chip maker
Measured
Code and model weights
Releases
Sigstore transparency log
Pinned
The expected release
On failure
Nothing is sent

Every party, every piece.

What each party on the path can see, and what stays sealed from it.

PartyYour wordsThe answersWhen and how muchYour IP address
Your network and ISPSealedSealedSeesSees
Cloudflare, at the edgeSealedSealedSeesSees
Thinkr relaySealedSealedSeesSees
The enclave providerSealedSealedSeesNo
The data centerSealedSealedSeesNo
The enclaveReadsReadsSeesNo

In plain words

Everyone on the way can tell that you sent something, and when. Only the enclave sees what you said.

How it works

The content is sealed from your device to the enclave. The metadata, the timing, the size, the model, and the address, stays visible on the path, and your IP address stops at the relay.

The details

Content
Device to enclave only
Metadata
Visible on the path
IP address
Stops at the relay
Answers
Padded in the stream

Where your data lives.

What is stored, where, and what is never stored.

In plain words

Your history stays with you. Thinkr keeps your account, not your chats. The enclave keeps nothing on disk.

How it works

The private lane is stateless on the server side: the relay meters, the enclave computes in memory, and the history lives on the device, sealed under a key that only you unlock.

The details

History
On your device
Thinkr
Account and usage
Enclave disk
Nothing written
Open lane
Zero data retention

Every model says who can read it.

The private lane is the default. The open lane serves the frontier models, with a label on each.

In plain words

The private lane is sealed and checkable. The open lane trusts a contract instead, and every model says which lane it is in.

How it works

Private-lane requests are sealed to attested enclaves. Open-lane requests go over TLS to the provider with zero data retention and data collection denied.

The details

Private lane
Sealed, attested
Open lane
TLS, zero retention
Default
Private lane
Private laneOpen lane
ModelsOpen-weight modelsClaude, GPT, Gemini, Grok
Runs inHardware enclavesThe cloud of the provider
Who can read a chatOnly the enclaveThe provider, and the relay in transit
Written to diskNothingNothing, by zero data retention
ProofRemote attestationA contract
Used for trainingNeverNever

What this does not protect.

Confidential computing lowers the risk. It does not remove it.

  • Physical attacks

    Someone with physical access to a server and lab tools can attack the chip itself. The enclaves run in data centers that Thinkr does not own.

  • Side channels

    Researchers keep finding ways to infer data from the timing or the power of these chips. The makers patch them, and the report names the firmware a chip runs.

  • Metadata

    The network, the relay, and the provider see when you send, how much, and which model. The relay also sees your IP address.

  • The code of this web app

    Your browser runs the code that thinkr.sh serves, so you trust that code as well as the enclave. Apps for desktop and phone come later.

  • Web search

    With web search on, the search query leaves the enclave for a search provider. The rest of the chat stays sealed.

  • The keys of the chip makers

    The proof rests on the keys of AMD, Intel, and NVIDIA. If a maker's key leaked, a fake report could pass.

The words, in plain words.

Eight terms that this page uses.

  • 01

    Enclave

    A sealed part of a server. The chip encrypts its memory, so the people and the software that run the server cannot look inside. Also called a trusted execution environment, or TEE.

  • 02

    Confidential computing

    Running code inside enclaves, so that data stays encrypted even while it is in use.

  • 03

    Remote attestation

    A report, signed by the chip, of exactly what an enclave runs. Anyone can check it against the keys of the chip maker.

  • 04

    Measurement

    A hash of the code and the data that an enclave started with. Change one byte and the hash changes.

  • 05

    Transparency log

    A public record of signed releases that can only grow. Anyone can audit it, so a secret release would stand out.

  • 06

    HPKE

    Hybrid Public Key Encryption, RFC 9180: it seals a message to a public key with a fresh key for each message.

  • 07

    Metadata

    Data about a message rather than in it: when it was sent, how large it is, and where it came from.

  • 08

    Zero data retention

    A term of a contract: the provider keeps no prompt and no answer after it replies.

Asked often.

Can Thinkr read my chats?

Not in the private lane: your words are sealed on your device and opened only inside the enclave. In the open lane the provider of the model can read the chat, and the label of the model says so.

Who runs the hardware?

A confidential-computing provider runs the enclaves on servers in data centers. Neither it nor Thinkr can read a chat, and your device checks the proof before it sends a word.

What happens if the check fails?

Your device sends nothing, and the app shows that the check failed.

How can I check the proof myself?

Each private chat in the app shows a badge, Verified, that opens the proof: the chip, the hash of the code, and the open-source release it matched.

Does the enclave keep my prompt?

It writes nothing to disk. Your prompt and its answer exist only in the encrypted memory of the enclave while it works on them.

Why trust the chip makers?

Their keys are public, every report is checked before your message leaves, and the code inside is open source. You check a signature instead of trusting a promise.

Are my chats used for training?

No. The private lane keeps nothing, and the open lane sends every request with data collection denied.

Is Thinkr anonymous?

No. Thinkr keeps an account for your plan and sees the metadata of each request. It never reads the content of a private chat.